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ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
 
The District Court Erred In Granting Breymann’s Motion To Suppress 
 
A. Based Upon The Concession Of The Prosecutor Below The State 
Withdraws Its Argument On Appeal That The District Court Erred When It 
Failed To Consider “All Of The Circumstances Surrounding The 
Interrogation” When It Determined That Breymann Was “In Custody” For 
The Purposes Of Miranda 
 
Deputy Herbig detained Breymann in handcuffs while he waited for 
backup so he could get the search warrant.  (Ex. 1 at 27:50 – 29:15.1)  The 
district court stated, without explanation, that Breymann was in custody when he 
was handcuffed by Deputy Herbig.  (R., p. 127.)  On appeal, the state challenged 
the district court’s failure to consider all of the circumstances surrounding the 
interrogation when it determined that Breymann was in custody.  (See 
Appellant’s Brief, pp. 14-18.)  However, at the hearing on Breymann’s motion to 
suppress the prosecutor stated:  
Once the handcuffs go onto the defendant – I’m gonna jump to the 
Fifth Amendment Miranda analysis now.  Once those – those cuffs 
go on in that – at that point, he is in custody.  And I’ll submit to that 
for the purposes of this suppression hearing and for the purpose of 
presentation of my case in chief.  I reserve the right, however, if 
issues arise, if a door is opened and outside the presence of the 
jury, I would seek admission of those other statements after the 
handcuffing.  But everywhere up until the handcuffing, Miranda 
wasn’t required because you have to have both custody and 
interrogation.   
                                            
1 At the hearing on Breymann’s motion to suppress the parties stipulated to the 
admission of Deputy Herbig’s body camera video, which was divided into 
Exhibits, 1, 2 and 3.  (Tr., p. 5, L. 9 – p. 6, L. 5.)  All exhibit video times 
referenced in this brief are approximate.   
 2 
(Tr., p. 46, L. 20 – p. 47, L. 62; see also Respondent’s Brief pp. 9-10.)  The state 
is bound by representations of the prosecutor below.  The state withdraws this 
argument on appeal.   
 
B. Even If Breymann Was In Custody, Breymann Voluntarily Waived His 
Miranda Rights 
 
After Deputy Herbig’s backup arrived, Deputy Herbig transported 
Breymann out to the patrol car.  (Ex. 2 at 11:22 – 12:28.)  Deputy Herbig 
removed the handcuffs and started to read Breymann his rights, but Breymann 
interrupted Deputy Herbig to ask a question.  (Ex. 3 at 0:00 – 1:15.)  After 
answering Breymann’s question, Deputy Herbig advised Breymann of his 
Miranda rights.  (Ex. 3 at 1:14 – 1:40.)  Breymann stated he understood his 
rights.  (Id.)   
Deputy Herbig asked what he was going to find in Breymann’s bedroom 
and Breymann again described the paraphernalia and residue.  (Ex. 3 at 2:40 – 
3:20.)  The district court held that because Breymann had a “fragile demeanor” 
and because he had been with Deputy Herbig for almost an hour, the Miranda 
warnings administered by Deputy Herbig did not “effectively advise [Breymann] 
‘that he had a real choice about giving an admissible statement at the 
juncture[.]’”  (R., p. 128.)  The district court erred. 
To determine whether a defendant has voluntarily, knowingly and 
intelligently waived his Miranda rights, the Court must consider the totality of the 
                                            
2 All transcript references are to the July 7, 2015 Motion to Suppress hearing, 
unless otherwise indicated.   
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circumstances.  State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 468, 272 P.3d 417, 440 (2012) 
(citing State v. Doe, 137 Idaho 519, 523, 50 P.3d 1014, 1018 (2002); State v. 
Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 559, 199 P.3d 123, 134 (2008)).  “The factors the Court 
must consider include: ‘(1) Whether Miranda warnings were given; (2) The youth 
of the accused; (3) The accused’s level of education or low intelligence; (4) The 
length of detention; (5) The repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; 
and (6) Deprivation of food or sleep.’” Id. (citing Doe, 137 Idaho at 523, 50 P.3d 
at 1018.) “Any waiver of Miranda warnings must be knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary.” Id. (citing Doe, 137 Idaho at 523, 50 P.3d at 1018).   
Despite the requirement that a district court must consider the six factors 
articulated by the Idaho Supreme Court to determine whether a defendant 
waived his or her Miranda rights, the district court here simply held that because 
Breymann had a “fragile demeanor” and had been with Deputy Herbig for almost 
an hour, his post-Miranda statements were inadmissible.  (See R., p. 128.3)   
On appeal, Breymann asserts that the district court did not err, but does 
not address the district court’s failure to consider the totality of the 
circumstances.  (See Respondent’s Brief, pp. 10-12.)  Further, the video 
evidence shows that Breymann knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his 
Miranda rights.   
                                            
3 The district court utilized some of the Miranda-waiver factors to determine 
whether Breymann’s “confession” was involuntary.  (See R., pp. 128-130.)  
However, this “confession” analysis does not extend to whether Breymann 
voluntarily waived his Miranda rights because as part of the “confession” analysis 
the district court found there was an “absence of Miranda warnings.” 
(R., p. 129.)   
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Deputy Herbig read Breymann his Miranda rights and provided a form.  
(Ex. 3 at 0:00 – 1:40.)  While there was a delay in waiting for Deputy Herbig’s 
backup to arrive, Breymann was not deprived of food or sleep.  Further, the 
nature of the questioning by Deputy Herbig was calm and respectful.  For 
example, during the discussion of Miranda rights, Deputy Herbig removed the 
handcuffs.  (Ex. 3 at 0:00 – 1:15.)  While Deputy Herbig was explaining the 
Miranda rights Breymann interrupted Deputy Herbig to ask a question and 
Deputy Herbig calmly answered Breymann’s question.  (Ex. 3 at 0:00 – 1:40.)  
Breymann asked to hug his mom, and Deputy Herbig allowed him to do so.  (Ex. 
3 at 2:20 – 2:27.)   
The district court erred when it did not consider the six factors required to 
determine whether Breymann knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his 
Miranda rights.  Further, the video evidence shows that Breymann’s Miranda 
waiver was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made.   
 
C. The District Court Erred When It Found Breymann’s Confession Was 
Involuntary, Because There Was No Police Coercion 
 
Apart from its Miranda-related holdings, the District Court also erred when 
it determined that Breymann’s “confession” was “involuntary.”  (See R., pp. 128-
130.)  “In determining whether a statement was involuntary, the inquiry is 
whether the defendant’s will was overborne by police coercion.”  State v. Hays, 
159 Idaho 476, __, 362 P.3d 551, 560-61 (Ct. App. 2015) (citing Arizona v. 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 286 (1991); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 177 
(1986); State v. Doe, 131 Idaho 709, 713, 963 P.2d 392, 396 (Ct. App. 1998); 
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State v. Davila, 127 Idaho 888, 892, 908 P.2d 581, 585 (Ct. App. 1995)).  
“[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a 
confession is not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.” Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167.   
There is nothing about the facts of this case that rendered Breymann’s 
confession involuntary as the product of police coercion.  See Hays, 159 Idaho 
at __, 362 P.3d at 560-61.  Breymann argues that Hays is distinguishable 
because Hays was a “normal traffic stop” whereas Deputy Herbig’s encounter 
with Breymann lasted 45 minutes and Deputy Herbig should have known about 
Breymann’s apparent susceptibility.  (See Respondent’s Brief, pp. 13-16.)  
Breymann is incorrect.  While Hays did state that the officer could not have 
known about Hays’ “apparent hypersensitivity,” it ultimately held that Hays’ 
hypersensitivity did “not bear on whether the officer’s conduct was coercive.”  
See Hays, 159 Idaho at __, 362 P.3d at 560-61 (“Hays’ apparent 
hypersensitivity, which Deputy Osborn could not have known, does not bear on 
whether the officer’s conduct was coercive.”).  Therefore, the proper analysis is 
focused on whether the police officer coerced the confession, not on the level of 
sensitivity of the defendant.4 
Breymann’s argument on appeal, like the district court’s analysis, is 
mistakenly focused on Breymann’s purported “heighted susceptibility to police 
coercion.”  (See id.)  Deputy Herbig did not coerce Breymann’s post-Miranda 
                                            
4 Regardless, the video shows Deputy Herbig being patient and calm with 
Breymann’s emotions and engaging him and his mother in conversation while 
they waited for Deputy Herbig’s backup.   
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statements.  Deputy Herbig only made contact with Breymann because 
Breymann’s father was worried about Breymann using drugs.  (Tr., p. 9, Ls. 11-
23.)  Deputy Herbig’s conduct was not coercive.  For example, Breymann’s 
mother was allowed to stay in the room after Breymann asked that she stay (Ex. 
1 at 30:18 – 30:30); Breymann complained that the handcuffs were too tight and 
Deputy Herbig immediately loosened the handcuffs (Ex. 2 at 0:45 – 1:18); 
Breymann, Deputy Herbig and Breymann’s mother casually talked about a friend 
of Breymann’s (Ex. 2 at 4:20 – 5:40); Breymann made a joke about being fat (Ex. 
2 at 6:38 – 6:42); when Breymann declined to tell Deputy Herbig where he got 
the “weed,” Deputy Herbig responded, “Ok.  I can respect that.”  (Ex. 2 at 7:38 – 
7:45); Breymann and his mother complained that there were some “really bad” 
and “very bad” police officers in the area, but they appreciated the “good ones” 
(Ex. 2 at 10:02 – 10:52); Breymann interrupted Deputy Herbig during the reading 
of the Miranda rights to ask a question (Ex. 3 at 0:00 – 1:15); and when 
Breymann requested that he be allowed to hug his mom, Deputy Herbig 
responded that “[h]e did not see why not.”  (Ex. 3 at 2:20 – 2:27).  Most of the 
encounter was consensual.  (See R., pp. 125-126.)  Breymann was only in 
handcuffs for approximately twelve minutes before backup arrived.  (R., p. 127.)  
Hays is not distinguishable.  Deputy Herbig did not coerce a post-Miranda 
confession out of Breymann.  The district court erred. 
 
D. Breymann’s Consent To Search His Room Was Not Coerced  
 
Deputy Herbig detained Breymann until he could get a warrant to search 
Breymann’s bedroom.  (Ex. 1 at 29:15 – 31:03; Ex. 2 at 0:00 – 1:58.)  Shortly 
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thereafter, and without prompting, Breymann told Deputy Herbig, “If you want to 
go search my room, go for it.  You can go search my room right now.”  (Ex. 2 at 
2:33 – 2:40.)  Deputy Herbig then started to talk to Breymann again, but 
Breymann cut him off and loudly told Deputy Herbig, “I grant you access to 
search my room!”  (Ex. 2 at 3:12 – 3:17.)  Breymann later filled out the consent 
to search form.  (Ex. 3 at 3:48 – 6:40.)  The district court erred when it decided 
that Deputy Herbig coerced Breymann’s consent.   
Breymann argues that his consent was coerced because Deputy Herbig 
asked at least five times for consent to search.  (See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 16-
19.)  While Deputy Herbig did ask several times for consent to search, the actual 
consent was granted when, without prompting, Breymann told Deputy Herbig, “If 
you want to go search my room, go for it.  You can go search my room right 
now.”  (Ex. 2 at 2:33 – 2:40.)  This consent was repeated by Breymann.  (See 
Ex. 2 at 3:12 – 3:17, Ex. 3 at 3:48 – 6:40.)  Breymann knew he had the right to 
refuse consent – because Breymann initially denied consent.   
And when Breymann denied consent, Deputy Herbig legally detained 
Breymann while Deputy Herbig started the process of getting a search warrant.  
See State v. Kapelle, 158 Idaho 121, 129, 344 P.3d 901, 909 (Ct. App. 2014) 
(officers can detain a suspect to preserve the status quo while they obtain a 
search warrant). Deputy Herbig had probable cause to get a search warrant to 
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search Breymann’s room5 – and was in fact waiting for backup to arrive so he 
could get the search warrant.  “A consent is not rendered invalid merely because 
an officer has said that a warrant will be sought if consent is refused.”  State v. 
Tietsort, 145 Idaho 112, 118, 175 P.3d 801, 807 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing State v. 
Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 163 P.3d 1194 (2007); State v. Fee, 135 Idaho 857, 863, 
26 P.3d 40, 46 (Ct. App. 2001); State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho 747, 947 P.2d 420 (Ct. 
App. 1997); see also State v. Ballou, 145 Idaho 840, 848, 186 P.3d 696, 704 (Ct. 
App. 2008).  Breymann was legally detained by Deputy Herbig.  While they 
waited for backup to get the search warrant, Breymann changed his mind and 
repeatedly granted consent to search.  This was a voluntary choice by 
Breymann.  Breymann knew he could refuse consent.  There was no coercion by 




 The state respectfully requests this Court reverse the district court’s 
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Suppress and 
remand this case for further proceedings. 
 DATED this 20th day of July, 2016. 
 
       
 /s/ Ted S. Tollefson________________ 
 TED S. TOLLEFSON 
 Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
                                            
5 Deputy Herbig had probable cause to get a warrant before he detained 
Breymann in handcuffs.  (See Ex. 1 at 25:30 – 26:20.)  Therefore, the probable 
cause analysis is unaffected by any potential suppression of post-custody, pre-
Miranda statements.   
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